UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SEQUAN NORMAN,

v.

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06836(JBS-AMD)

CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,

OPINION

Defendant.

APPEARANCES

Sequan Norman
Plaintiff Pro Se
1504 Wildwood Avenue
Camden, NJ 08103

SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:

- 1. Plaintiff Sequan Norman seeks to bring a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Camden County Jail ("CCJ") for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.
- 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

- 3. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (1) dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against CCJ; and (2) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
- 4. First, the Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice as to claims made against the CCJ because defendant is not a "state actor" within the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v.

 McMillian, No. 16-3412, 2016 WL 6134846, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2016) ("[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.") (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a "person" under § 1983).
- 5. Second, the Complaint does not allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order to survive this Court's review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff's Complaint as true for screening purposes only, there is not enough factual support for the Court to infer a constitutional violation has occurred.
- 6. To survive *sua sponte* screening for failure to state a claim¹, the Complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to

 $^{^1}$ "The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the

show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308

n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or
conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally
construed, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts
in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay
Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).

7. With respect to alleged facts giving rise to his claims, Plaintiff's Complaint states that he was "locked down stairs [sic] in the process room with like 25 to 30 males into

same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Samuels v. Health Dep't, No. 16-1289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017) (citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012)); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App'x 230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

one cell & then being taking [sic] up to 7 day with like 5 males in on[e] room. [I] had to be placed on the floor as my sleeping area [was] near the door. [P]eople stepping over me & nasty people with pee and feces. My stay there I stayed on the floor." Complaint § III(C).

- 8. Plaintiff states that the purported events giving rise to his claims occurred "10/10/15 when I was brought into the County Jail in Camden, NJ." Id. § III(B).
- 9. With respect to injuries related to the alleged events, Plaintiff contends: "My back hurts hear [sic] & there. I never went to get it checked yet." Id. § IV.
- 10. Plaintiff does not quantify damages for relief he seeks. *Id*. § V ("not living like animals or being treated like one").
- 11. Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because the Complaint does not set forth enough factual support for the Court to infer that a constitutional violation has occurred.
- 12. The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348-50 (1981) (holding double-celling by itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill, 488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) ("[M]ere double-bunking does not constitute punishment, because there is no 'one man,

one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'" (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis requires courts to consider whether the totality of the conditions "cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them."). Some relevant factors are the length of the confinement(s), whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, any specific individuals who were involved in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of confinement, any other relevant facts regarding the conditions of confinement, etc.

- 13. For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a) dismissed with prejudice as to the CCJ; and (b) dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
 - 14. An appropriate order follows.

February 2, 2017s/ Jerome B. SimandleDateJEROME B. SIMANDLEChief U.S. District Judge